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Yemeni Archive preserves, enhances and memorialises documentation of human rights violations and other crimes committed by all parties to conflict in Yemen for use in advocacy, justice and accountability.



<p>Our mission is to preserve, enhance and memorialise documentation of human rights violations and other crimes committed by all parties to conflict in Yemen for use in advocacy, justice and accountability.</p>
<p>Yemeni Archive is a project of <a href="https://mnemonic.org">Mnemonic</a>, a non-profit organisation made up of human rights advocates, archivists, technologists, and open source investigators dedicated to preserving, memorialising and adding value to publicly available information related to human rights violations. To see more about its work and other archives visit <a href="https://mnemonic.org">Mnemonic</a>.</p>
<h2>What we do</h2>
<h3>We archive</h3>
<p>Since 2018, Yemeni Archive has archived disappearing and precarious content posted on social media platforms. The archive has grown to house half a million million videos and social media posts of the Yemeni conflict. We have verified and published 8,000 of these videos on an online, searchable database in order to support other investigators and journalists.</p>
<h3>We train</h3>
<p>Alongside other members of the Mnemonic team, Yemeni Archive has trained over 250 activists, journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders on using our tools and methodologies for their own investigative work.</p>
<p>We host a training programme for students of journalism and law from Yemeni universities. Through our programme, students get hands-on experience in open source investigation methods, use of media as evidence, campaigning and advocacy, photography journalism and digital security.</p>
<h3>We report</h3>
<p>By verifying evidence and working alongside Yemeni journalists on the ground, we help tell stories from Yemen that need to be heard worldwide.</p>
<h3>We build tools</h3>
<p>We collaborate with technologists to build open-source tools to automatically download material through the development of Diwan and to automatically find objects within the videos through the development of VFRAME. To learn more about our work with VFRAME see this talk from 2018.</p>
<h2>How we do it</h2>
<p>Where possible, Yemeni Archive works in the open. We develop and use open-source technology and methodologies and document our work so that others can replicate and reuse the approaches we have developed.</p>
<p>We work in collaboration with other archival groups, lawyers and journalists to develop our methodology, and with other technologists to develop the open source tools we are using</p>
<h2>Why we do it</h2>
<p>Yemeni Archive began in 2018 as a sister project to Syrian Archive and under the umbrella of Mnemonic. We archive content quickly and methodically before it is removed from the online platforms it is being posted to . Yemeni Archive is dedicated to preserving this important data as digital memory and increasing public access to this essential knowledge. Through archiving, verifying and investigating documentation of human rights violations in Yemen, we preserve data as digital memory, and act as a resource for those working on advocacy and accountability.
Though it has led to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis according to the UN, the conflict in Yemen has often been described as a “forgotten war”. We believe that continued investigation and reporting of human rights violations is imperative to pressuring perpetrators to protect Yemeni civilians.</p>
<p>We believe that visual documentation of human rights violations that is transparent, detailed, and reliable is critical towards providing accountability and can positively contribute to post-conflict reconstruction and stability. Such documentation can humanise victims, reduce the space for dispute over numbers killed, help societies understand the true human costs of war, and support truth and reconciliation efforts.</p>
<p>Archiving and preservation of digital materials providing information about human rights abuses and war crimes is increasingly recognised as critical for legally implementing justice and accountability. The sheer amount of content created and removed from public platforms means we are in a race against time; content we have preserved and verified might offer the only evidence indicating a human rights violations had happened, implicating potential perpetrators and aiding in long-term transitional justice efforts.</p>


index

<h2>General</h2><p>We are always looking for new ways to collaborate with other human rights organisations, local media offices, activists, researchers and investigators.</p><p>requests@yemeniarchive.org</p><h2>Press</h2><p>info@yemeniarchive.org</p><h2>Website and Technology</h2><p>info@yemeniarchive.org</p><p>&nbsp;</p>

Contact Us

Press

<h2>Copyright</h2>
<p>Unless otherwise specified, all material on this site remains the property of the originator, who retains full control over how it is shared and distributed. The Yemeni Archive is licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)</a>.</p>
<p>If you use or remix our work please let us know by sending an email to info [at] yemeniarchive [dot] org.</p>
<h2>Disclaimer</h2>
<h3>Limitation of liability for internal content</h3>
<p>The content of our website has been compiled with meticulous care and to the best of our knowledge. However, we can not assume any liability for the up-to-date ness, Completeness or accuracy of any of the pages.</p>
<p>Pursuant to section 7, para. 1 of the TMG (Telemedia Act - Telemedia Act by German law), we as service providers are liable for our own content on Diese Seiten in Accordance with general laws. However, Pursuant to sections 8 to 10 of the TMG, we as service providers are not under obligation to monitor external information provided or stored on our website.</p>
<h3>Limitation of liability for external links</h3>
<p>Our website contains links to the websites of third parties (&quot;external links&quot;). As the content of these websites is not under our control, we can not assume any liability for external content search. In all cases, the provider of information of the linked websites is liable for the content and accuracy of the information provided.</p>
<h3>Limitation of liability for technical damage and data loss</h3>
<p><strong>a.</strong> The Yemeni Archive website accepts no liability in the event that all or part of the material is lost.</p>
<p><strong>b.</strong> The Yemeni Archive website accepts no liability for any damage or losses resulting from acts or omissions by third parties to whom the website has made the materials available.
However, The Yemeni Archive website will keep the digital material under optimal circumstances as much as possible.</p>
<h2>Data use policy</h2>
<p>The Yemeni Archive is operated by Mnemonic, a non-profit operating from Berlin, Germany and is governed by EU Data law.
By accessing this website, you are agreeing to be bound by its website Terms and Conditions of Use, all applicable laws and regulations, and agree that you are responsible for compliance with any applicable local laws. If you do not agree with any of these terms, you are not not authorized to use or accessing this site and its services. The materials contained in this website are protected by applicable copyright and trademark law.</p>
<p>A visit to our website or any website can result in the storage on our server of information about the access (date, time, user location, page accessed, device accesses, fingerprint information of the browser used). We do not keep logs or analyse this information or other personal data (eg, name, address or email address). Any forwarding of the data to third parties without the express consent of the user shall not take place.</p>
<p>We would like to point out expressly that the transmission of data via the Internet (eg, by e-mail) comes with security vulnerabilities. It is impossible to safeguard the data against access by third parties completely without the use of public key encryption. We can not assume any liability for damages as a result of users security vulnerabilities. However, you have the ability to contact us using email encryption by sending an email to: info [at] yemeniarchive [dot] org. Our fingerprint is: 9469 C8A4 9BA4 13BD 0DF7 36E8 EA38 3E31 D42E F5AB. Also use <a href="https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/">secure communication</a> (SSL) and <a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor</a> to protect your privacy and anonymity.</p>


Legal

<p>Access to Yemen in order to investigate and report on human rights violations is very restricted and dangerous for independent journalists, international news agencies, UN investigation bodies, and international human rights organisations. This is the principal reason the Yemeni Archive and other documentation groups depend on verified user-generated content to assist in criminal case-building as well as human rights research.</p><p>The Yemeni Archive strives for transparency in its tools, findings, and methodologies; as well as making sure that verified content is publicly available and accessible for journalists, human rights defenders, and lawyers working for the purpose of reporting, advocacy, and accountability purposes.</p><p>To achieve transparency, software developed by the Yemeni Archive is released in free and open-source formats. This is done to ensure trust is built and maintained with our partners and collaborators, as well as allowing software to be reused and customised by other groups outside of the Yemeni Archive. Technical integration with existing open-source investigative tools ensures that work is not duplicated. The Yemeni Archive works alongside technologists to develop our open-source tools. Our methodology is developed in collaboration with other archival groups, as well as lawyers and journalists.</p><p>The Yemeni Archive’s <strong>Data and Operational Model</strong> is based on the <a href="https://www.edrm.net/edrm-model/">Electronic Discovery Reference Model</a> developed by Duke University School of Law. Below is a detailed description of every step of this model.</p><p>Our collection process involved establishing a standardised metadata schema alongside a database of credible sources for digital content. Sources can be direct submissions from individuals and organisations, publicly available social media accounts and channels, as well as other publicly available information.</p><p><img src="/uploads/Small_graphs_outline_1_Collection_06_29650bfd52.png">&nbsp;</p><h3>1) Establish database of credible sources for content</h3><p>Before any collection, archival, or verification of digital materials was possible, we had to establish a database of credible sources for visual content. We have identified over 1.167 credible sources, including individual journalists and field reporters, larger media houses (e.g. local and international news agencies), human rights organisations, local field clinics and hospitals. Many of these sources began publishing or providing visual content in 2015 and also publish work in other credible media outlets.</p><p>Visual content is primarily accessed through social media channels (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Websites, Telegram), submitted files (videos, photos, pdf), and external and collaborators’ data sets. Changes in these data sets are tracked, meaning that all versions are saved.</p><p>Credibility is determined by analysing whether the source is familiar to us, or our existing network, as well as checking that the source's content and reportage has been reliable in the past. This might include evaluating how long the source has been reporting and how active they are.</p><p>To identify where the source is based, social media channels might be evaluated to determine if videos uploaded are consistently from a specific location, or whether locations differ significantly. Channels and accounts might be analysed to determine whether they use a logo and whether this logo is consistently used across videos. Channels and accounts might be additionally analysed for original content to determine whether the uploader aggregates videos from other news organisations or accounts, or whether the source appears to be the primary uploader.</p><h3>2) Establish database of credible sources for verification</h3><p>Yemeni Archive established a database of credible sources for verification. These sources provide additional information used to verify content on social media platforms or received from sources directly. Content verifiers include citizen journalists, human rights defenders and humanitarian workers based in Yemen and abroad. To preserve data integrity, sources used for content acquisition do not comprise part of the database for verification.</p><h3>3) Establish standardised metadata scheme</h3><p>Before we can preserve or verify any content we must define a system through which content can be managed and organised, this is done through metadata. Establishing a data ontology or metadata scheme is necessary to assist us in organising and managing content as well as helping users in identifying and understanding what happened, and when and where.</p><p>Whilst recognising the need for a data ontology, or standardised metadata scheme. We also recognise that the implementation of any metadata scheme is a highly political choice. Given that there are no universally accepted, legally admissible metadata standards, efforts were made to develop a framework in consultation with a variety of international investigative bodies. These include consultations with members of the United Nations Office for High Commissioner of Human Rights, and with other archival institutes, and human rights and research organisations.</p><p>Adding metadata happens after content is preserved but it is crucial to define a metadata scheme before collecting and processing content.</p><p>Yemeni Archive’s collection and secure preservation workflow ensures that original content is not lost due to its removal from corporate platforms. This is achieved by collecting and securely storing digital content on external backend servers before it is taken offline and prior to basic verification procedures. Content is then backed up securely on servers throughout the world. We use our in-house software, Diwan, that is developed for human rights investigations using online user-generated content.</p><p><img src="/uploads/Small_graphs_outline_2_Preservation_07_7f354061c8.png">&nbsp;</p><blockquote><p>Diwan is a tool designed to support journalists, non-profits, academic researchers, human rights organisations and others with investigations using online, publicly-available sources (e.g.tweets, videos, public databases, websites, online databases).</p></blockquote><p>In this preservation pipeline we detect the spoken language, and standardise the data format (whilst preserving the old format). We screenshot and download the web page hosting the content. Files that are in our database get both their md5 and sha256 hash and are time-stamped with <a href="https://www.enigio.com/">Enigio Time</a> - a third party collaborator. We hash and timestamp in order to ensure and prove data integrity which means that data has not been changed or manipulated since it has been archived.</p><p>Once content has been safely preserved metadata is extracted from visual content, its parsed and aggregated automatically using our predefined and standardised metadata schema. Location and source details might be included in the parsed metadata which can be useful to geolocate where content originates.</p><p><img src="/uploads/Small_graphs_outline_3_Processing_08_1c5bbdb2bc.png">&nbsp;</p><p>Metadata is added both automatically and manually, depending on how it was collected, e.g open source or closed source. A detailed description and full list of metadata field types are provided on our website. Metadata we collect includes a description of the visual object as given (e.g. YouTube title); the source of the visual content; the original link where the footage was first published; identifiable landmarks; weather (which may be useful for geolocation or time identification); specific languages or regional dialects spoken; identifiable clothes or uniforms; weapons or munitions; device used to record the footage; and media content type.</p><p>The processing pipeline also passes video files into keyframes, as well as using the machine learning software, <a href="vfame.io">V-FRAME</a>.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><blockquote><p>VFRAME is a collection of open-source computer vision software tools designed for human rights investigations relying on large datasets of visual media. It utilises object detection algorithms that can automatically flag video content depicting predefined objects, such as cluster munitions.</p></blockquote><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Our data pipeline prepares visual content for initial verification. All possible additional tags and chain of custody information is recorded. This is done to assist users in identifying and understanding what happened in a specific incident, and when and where.</p><p><img src="/uploads/Small_graphs_outline_4_Verification_09_eb04624c18.png"></p><p>Verification consists of three steps: 1) Verify the source of the video uploader or publisher; 2) Verify the location where the video was filmed; 3) Verify the dates and times on which the video was filmed and uploaded.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><strong>Verify the source of the video publisher</strong></p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Firstly we establish whether the source of the video is on our list of credible sources. If not, we determine the new source's credibility by going through the above procedure.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>In some cases, near-duplicate content may be published. For example, if a 10-minute video includes all of a second 30-second video – both videos would be preserved as long as they can be verified. Similarly, videos from news organisations or media houses featuring parts of other videos are also preserved– as long as verification is possible. We also preserve duplications if they are from different sources and the original uploader is unidentifiable.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>The video-upload source may differ from the camera operator. In most of the video footage which we verify, only the video uploader and not the camera operator can be identified. In advanced verification of priority cases, the analysis phase includes identifying the camera operator.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><strong>Verify the location where the video was filmed</strong></p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Each video goes through basic geolocation to verify that it has been captured in Yemen. A more accurate geolocation process is implemented for priority content in order to pinpoint its origin to a more accurate location. This is done by comparing visual references (e.g. buildings, mountain ranges, trees, minarets) with satellite imagery from Google Earth, and Maxar as well as geolocated photographs from Google Maps. Satellite imagery is also used to assess damage and destruction whilst investigating attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>In addition to this, the Yemeni Archive compares the Arabic spoken in videos against known regional accents and dialects within Yemen to further verify the location of videos. When possible, we contact sources directly, and consult our existing network of journalists operating inside and outside Yemen to confirm the locations of specific incidents.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><strong>Verify the dates and times in which the video was filmed and uploaded</strong></p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>We use time and date metadata embedded in videos we directly receive in order to corroborate the date and time of a specific incident. Date and time are extracted using the <a href="https://exiftool.org">ExifTool</a>.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>We verify the capture date of videos by cross-referencing their publishing date on social media platforms (e.g YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram) with dates from reports concerning the same incident. Visual content collected directly from sources is also cross-referenced with reports concerning the incident featured in the video.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Those reports include:</p><p>&nbsp;</p><ul><li>Reports from international and local media outlets;</li><li>Human rights reports published by international and local organisations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Yemeni Data Project, and Physicians for Human Rights;</li><li>Incident reports shared by the Yemeni Archive's network of citizen reporters on Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram.</li></ul><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Additional techniques such as reverse image search and chronolocation can also be used to confirm the capture time and date of the visual content.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>In some cases, we conduct in-depth open-source investigations. Time and capacity limitations mean not all incidents can be analysed in-depth. However, by developing a replicable workflow it is hoped that others assist in these efforts, and investigate other incidents using similar methods. A detailed overview of our in-depth incident analysis is provided in the investigations page of our website.</p><p><img src="/uploads/Small_graphs_outline_5_Investigations_10_17ade6c746.png"></p><h3>Witness Statements</h3><p>&nbsp;</p><p>For some incidents, our team of researchers collect witness statements or partner with organisations that do. In the past, this has included working with Justice for Life, and other organisations whose role is collecting accounts of survivors, the injured, family members, or eyewitnesses (e.g. medical staff, managers of hospitals).</p><p>&nbsp;</p><h3>Review</h3><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Once content has been processed, verified, and analysed, it is reviewed for accuracy. In the event of a discrepancy, content is fed back into the digital evidence workflow for further verification. If content is deemed accurate it moves to the publishing stage of the digital evidence workflow.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>For more information the tools or methods we are using, <strong>please reach out to info [at] yemeniarchive [dot] org</strong></p><p>&nbsp;</p>

Methods and Tools

Privacy Policy

<p>The team working on the Yemeni Archive is uniquely comprised of researchers, journalists, technologists and digital security experts who have been working in the field of human rights, verification, open source technologies and investigation methodologies for the past ten years. They are motivated in their mission to enable various stakeholders such as lawyers, journalists and activists, to be able to find, store and use publicly available content to not only document human rights violations but also to be able to use this content to prosecute those both perpetrating and enabling these crimes.</p>


Research methodology

Collect

Content identification, acquisition and standardisation

preserve

Secure long term preservation

process

Cataloging and metadata enrichment

verify

Verification

Investigate

Accessibility and raising awareness

More about

Contact Us

Press

Legal

Methods and Tools

Privacy Policy

Team

Funding

Partners

Funders

Research methodology

Collect

Content identification, acquisition and standardisation

preserve

Secure long term preservation

process

Cataloging and metadata enrichment

verify

Verification

Investigate

Accessibility and raising awareness

More about

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Press

Legal

Methods and Tools

Privacy Policy

Team

Funding

Partners

Funders

Contact Us