Introduction

As part of Yemen’s ongoing conflict, civilians across the country have endured the burden of a prolonged and deepening economic crisis. It has recently been worsened by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on key ports, which have caused severe economic impacts due to shortages of fuel.

Since assuming control over large parts of northern Yemen in 2014, Ansarullah (Houthi) Movement authorities have established a range of taxation, customs, zakat, licensing, and other revenue collection practices affecting businesses and civilians in areas under their control. Open-source reporting has also documented additional financial demands imposed under administrative, religious, and public initiatives across multiple sectors of the economy. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, revenue generation has included levies imposed on individuals and companies, sales taxes on selected goods, general taxes on imports, and the collection of revenues across multiple economic sectors.

This investigation examines reported practices across commercial activities, agriculture, transportation, education, healthcare, and other sectors. It documents reported revenue collection mechanisms, including taxes, levies, customs and checkpoint collections, licensing requirements, mandatory contributions, and other administrative measures; as well as reported enforcement practices, responses by businesses and communities, and the broader economic and social impacts described in available open-source material.

Many public-sector employees in Houthi-controlled areas have experienced years of salary interruptions, while rising prices, declining purchasing power, and deteriorating public services have increased financial pressures on households. This broader economic context is important when assessing the impact documented in this investigation, as economic harms cannot necessarily be attributed to revenue collection practices alone.

Methodology

Yemeni Archive conducted this investigation using a multi-stage open-source research approach, which included:

Collecting, preserving, and analyzing 104 digital records, including social media posts, videos, news articles from online platforms and reports issued by local and international organizations.
Examining possible patterns rather than isolated incidents. The case studies presented span multiple years and different geographic areas under Houthi control. They were selected based on the availability of open-source material and their relevance to the themes examined in this investigation.
Currency conversions are approximate and, unless otherwise stated, are based on the recent exchange rate in Houthi-controlled areas of YR530 to USD1 (compared with around YR1,500 to USD1 in Aden). They may therefore not reflect the exchange rate at the time of the reported incident or payment.

For more information about Yemeni Archive’s research methodology, please visit our website.

Types of Revenue Collection Practices

Revenue collection in Houthi-controlled areas encompasses different forms of financial obligations that vary in their legal basis, stated purpose, and method of implementation. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, customs duties, taxes, zakat (an obligatory form of charitable giving in Islam), non-tax revenues, and other fees constitute sources of revenue in Houthi-controlled areas. Some forms resemble conventional public revenue collection, including taxes, customs duties, zakat, licensing fees, and other regulatory charges. Others consist of financial demands linked to political, religious, military, or public campaigns, including fundraising initiatives associated with support for Palestine, Houthi military efforts, and other causes.

These mechanisms did not all originate with Houthi control: taxation, customs duties, and zakat formed part of Yemen’s pre-conflict public revenue system. Before the conflict, customs collection was concentrated primarily at international ports, airports, and land border crossings, while zakat was collected through local authorities under Yemen’s existing legal framework.

Following their consolidation of control over Sana’a and large parts of northern Yemen, Houthi authorities retained some existing state revenue institutions while restructuring or expanding others.

Zakat and Khums:

In 2018, the Houthi-controlled Supreme Political Council (SPC) established the General Authority of Zakat (GAZ), centralizing the collection and administration of zakat that had previously been partly managed through local authorities. In 2020, Houthi authorities adopted new zakat regulations that introduced a broader application of khums, meaning ‘one-fifth.’ Khums refers to a 20 percent levy introduced under the executive regulations of Yemen's Zakat Law issued by the Houthi-controlled SPC in April 2020. Articles 47 and 48 of the regulations apply the levy to specified natural resources and products, including minerals, oil and gas, gold, silver, fish, pearls, and honey. The regulations also set out six categories for the distribution of the collected revenue, several of which specifically reference Hashimi (also written as Hashemite), families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Mwatana for Human Rights criticized these provisions as discriminatory, arguing that they institutionalized the distribution of resources on the basis of lineage. The Sana’a Center reported that this represented a significant departure from the previous legal framework and that khums had not previously been implemented in this form in the Republic of Yemen.

Doubled Customs:

Customs collection also changed over the course of the conflict. Chatham House documented that before the conflict, Yemen’s Customs Authority primarily collected revenues at international points of entry, including Hudaydah, Aden, and Mukalla ports and land border crossings. After 2015, the Houthis established additional customs collection points on internal trade routes. More recent research by the Mokha Center for Strategic Studies describes these collections as evolving from relatively dispersed checkpoint-based practices into a more institutionalized network. According to the report, fixed internal customs stations began to be established from 2017, while later measures introduced standardized procedures, electronic reporting, and centralized financial reporting.

Fundraising Campaigns:

Open-source reporting has also documented mandatory financial contributions associated with political, religious, military, and public campaigns, including collections linked to support for Palestine, religious commemorations, and Houthi military activities. For example, Sanaa Center described a range of Houthi-led fundraising efforts in support of Palestine, though some have reported that these constitute coercion or demands for donations.

Financial collections conducted under fundraising initiatives have been linked to political, religious, and infrastructure-related causes. According to a May 2021 report by Belqees TV, Houthi authorities organized fundraising campaigns in Sana'a, Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, Ibb, and Dhamar during Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr under initiatives presented as supporting Palestine. The report stated that financial contributions were collected from merchants, street vendors, public and private establishments, and even government institutions. Fundraising campaigns reportedly coincided with organized public events and demonstrations, during which additional financial contributions were collected under the slogan ‘Jerusalem is Closer.’ According to local sources cited by Ibb Media Center later that year, merchants and shop owners in Ibb Governorate were reportedly required to make financial contributions under the ‘support Jerusalem’ campaign. The same source also reported that the Houthi Public Works Office imposed an additional 15 percent surcharge on building permit fees under the same initiative.

A news report by Aden TV in May 2025 documented revenue collection focussed on infrastructure. According to the report, Houthi authorities carried out a fundraising campaign targeting merchants and business owners in Sana'a under the stated objective of financing the reconstruction of Sana'a International Airport following Israeli airstrikes. Merchants were reportedly given a deadline to provide financial contributions and were threatened with the closure of their businesses and arrest if they refused to comply.

In July 2026, Taiz News Network reported that Houthi authorities distributed empty boxes to homes, shops and markets in Sana'a, requesting residents to provide financial donations as part of a fundraising campaign.

The distinction between these practices is relevant to this investigation because the existence of taxation, customs duties, licensing requirements, or zakat collection does not in itself demonstrate abusive or improper revenue raising. Rather, this investigation examines how these measures have reportedly been implemented and their documented impacts on businesses and civilians. According to the Mokha Center, internal customs collection has evolved into a system combining administrative revenue collection with the involvement of security and military actors. As demonstrated in the sections below, available reporting also describes substantial increases in existing charges, duplicate customs assessments, restrictions on the movement of commercial goods, business closures, and the reported use of detention and other enforcement measures in connection with payment demands.

The practices documented in this investigation are not exhaustive. Houthi authorities have used additional mechanisms to collect money or seize assets from individuals and businesses that could not all be covered here. These include practices relating to waqf (public or religious endowments, including land and other property) which fall beyond the scope of this investigation.

Revenue Collection Across Sectors

The examples included in this section were selected because they illustrate recurring patterns reported across multiple years, governorates, and sectors under Houthi control.

Agriculture

Revenue collection practices reportedly extend to the agricultural sector, affecting multiple stages of agricultural production and distribution in areas under Houthi control. In Taiz Governate in October 2025, Al Nkkar Media reported on an official document issued by the General Authority of Zakat instructing local officials to prevent farmers from harvesting their crops until representatives of the authority had been notified and were present. According to the source, this measure was intended to give zakat authority officials time to visit villages and assess the amount of zakat that each farmer would owe, with payments pursued after the end of the harvest season. Tihama24 reported in February 2026 that onion farmers in Al Mokha and Al Hudaydah faced levies imposed at checkpoints along internal transportation routes. Farmers and traders stated that several internal roads and crossing points were temporarily closed before movement was permitted again in exchange for additional fees collected at checkpoints. According to those accounts, a checkpoint at Jawlat al-Qasr charged 500 Yemeni rials for each sack of onions transported through the crossing (around USD0.94), increasing transportation and distribution costs.

A video shared on X in March 2025 by Sanaa Now showed armed men firing their weapons in a market. The accompanying post claimed that more than 20 Houthi-affiliated military vehicles entered garlic wholesale markets in Sanaa as authorities reportedly sought to enforce new restrictions on garlic sales. The post claimed that traders were required to sell their produce exclusively through an affiliated agricultural services institution which would charge a mandatory seven percent commission. The post also alleged that traders were prohibited from purchasing garlic directly from farmers or transporting it to other governorates without paying additional levies.

Screenshot from a video shared on X by Sanaa Now, showing an armed man standing next to what appears to be a pile of garlic sacks. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 7 July 2026.

A post by Taiz News Network on X reported that in July 2026 the Houthis increased customs fees on flour shipments passing through Al Rahdah crossing in Taiz Governorate from approximately 350,000 Yemeni rials per truck to more than 3,000,000 rials. A video published three days later, appearing to be filmed by a truck driver, reportedly showed dozens of trucks carrying flour remaining stranded at the Al Rahdah crossing, with the driver stating that a charge of 3,700 Yemeni rials per sack of flour had been imposed, delaying the delivery of flour intended for residents of Taiz city. It is not clear whether the charge per sack of flour and the charge per truck represented separate charges or different descriptions of the same policy.

Similar practices were also reported in the livestock sector. According to Asharq Al-Awsat, in June 2026 the Houthi-controlled General Authority for Environmental Protection in the governorates of Raymah and Ibb introduced new regulations and fees targeting livestock owners. A circulated official document issued by the authority's branch in Raymah reportedly required livestock owners and animal shelter operators to pay for new permits; local sources reported that those who failed to comply were threatened with punitive measures.

Image of a Houthi circular reportedly requiring livestock breeders in Raymah to pay levies. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 7 July 2026.

Education

Open-source information documented increasing costs for families using public schools in Houthi-controlled areas, despite public education being formally free under Yemen’s Constitution. In 2023, the amount collected from students under what Houthi authorities described as a ‘community contribution’ was initially equivalent to approximately USD 2 per student, later increased to USD 4, and subsequently to USD 16 per student by 2026. The source reported these increases in the context of prolonged salary interruptions affecting more than 170,000 teachers in Houthi-controlled areas, and additional costs faced by families for school textbooks.

In June 2026, a post by Al Nkkar documented similar costs in Sana’a but provided a breakdown of the amounts reportedly paid by families. Parents interviewed by Al Nkkar stated that the ‘community contribution’ fee ranged from YR4,000 to YR8,000 (approximately USD 7.5-15 at an exchange rate of YR530/USD) per student for the two school terms, in addition to registration fees of up to YR1,000 (USD 1.90) and approximately YR3,000 to YR6,000 (USD 5.70-11.30) for textbooks. The source gave an example that registering three children in a public school could cost a family more than YR50,000 (USD 94) excluding uniforms, school supplies and transportation. Although education authorities in Sana’a described the ‘community contribution’ as voluntary, parents interviewed by Al Nkkar said that in practice it had become a requirement for registration. In August 2026, reporting from Ibb described an additional financial contribution imposed on students in public schools. School administrations were reportedly instructed by Houthi authorities to require students to pay at least YR500 (USD 0.94) each to fund events commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad.

The conditions described above are reportedly impacting children’s access to education: according to a report by Mwatana, rising textbook prices, annual school fees, and other education-related expenses placed additional financial burdens on households, leading some families to withdraw their children from school, exposing children to child labour or military recruitment.

In parallel, the Houthis have reportedly imposed additional financial obligations on private schools. In Ibb Governorate in November 2021, private schools were reportedly required to make financial contributions in support of what Houthi authorities described as the ‘Private School Convoy’, a fundraising initiative described by the sources as providing support to Houthi military efforts.

Screenshot of a receipt referencing a contribution to the "Private Schools Convoy" for the Houthi military. Captured by Yemeni Archive 7 July 2026.

Healthcare

In September 2019, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that Houthi authorities closed eight private hospitals in Sana'a and withdrew their licences, while operating rooms and intensive care units were reportedly closed in 25 additional public and private hospitals. Medical sources cited by the outlet attributed the closures to demands for financial contributions described as supporting the ‘war effort,’ and reported that some hospitals paid between YR1 million and YR3 million (approximately USD 1,890-5,660) to reopen. Three months later, the same outlet documented additional financial requirements affecting private healthcare facilities in Sana'a. According to medical sources cited by Asharq Al-Awsat, more than 13 private hospitals were targeted by a campaign requiring payments on surgical procedures, with a 4 percent charge applied where medical staff had a tax identification number and 15 percent where they did not. Medical workers and residents cited by the outlet expressed concern that these additional costs could be passed on to patients through higher service and treatment costs.

Similar financial demands continued to be reported in subsequent years. According to Asharq Al-Awsat, in August 2021 Houthi authorities required private hospitals, clinics, and medical laboratories in Sana'a to allocate 20 percent of their revenues to the Houthis under ‘Khums’. The outlet also reported that Houthi authorities increased licensing fees for healthcare professionals. Health workers cited by the outlet stated that these measures increased operating costs and contributed to higher fees for medical services, affecting patients' access to healthcare. Separately, in February 2023 Yemen Today reported that Houthi authorities required private hospitals and pharmaceutical companies in Ibb Governorate to provide money and medical supplies for a ‘medical convoy’ supporting fighters (analogous to the ‘private schools convoy’ described above).

More recently, in July 2026, Ahdath Al Alam reported that private clinics, medical centers, and hospitals in Houthi-controlled Al Hawban continued to face financial demands imposed under multiple labels, including support for the 'war effort,' the missile force and the naval forces; and funding convoys and sectarian events organized by the Houthi group.

Across these sectors, the material reviewed by Yemeni Archive documents different forms of financial obligations imposed on businesses, professionals, schools, healthcare facilities, farmers, and traders, as well as reported impacts on cost and accessibility of civilian services, from the early 2020s through to the present day.

Commercial and Private-Sector

Open-source material suggests that private-sector businesses operating in areas under Houthi control have been affected through increased operating costs, licensing requirements, transport restrictions, and enforcement measures linked to revenue collection.

Mineral water factories

According to a video shared in July 2024 by Al Hadath on X, mineral water factories warned that continued revenue collection measures could force them to suspend operations. This followed the Houthis reportedly imposing an additional fee of 20 Yemeni rials on every case of bottled water in support of what they described as the ‘Teacher and Education Support Fund’, a fund established in December 2019 to provide financial incentives for teachers, paid-for through charges imposed on a range of goods and services including bottled water. According to the Mineral Water Manufacturers Association, the new fee represented a 2,000 percent increase over the fee established by law. The report further stated that Houthi authorities suspended the tax registration numbers of water companies that did not pay, and detained trucks carrying raw materials at customs crossings, forcing mineral water factories to suspend production. The Association warned that the resulting factory closures could lead to the loss of thousands of jobs. This practice appears to have continued: a post shared on 20 May 2026 by Taiz News Network on X described how armed individuals affiliated with the Houthis surrounded the Shamlan Water Factory and prevented distribution trucks from leaving, reportedly in an attempt to compel the factory to make additional payments, resulting in a temporary suspension of operations.

Screenshot of a document circulated in April 2024, reportedly issued by the Houthi-controlled Tax Authority, instructing the suspension of tax registration numbers for mineral water companies and factories that refuse to make payments. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 14 July 2026.

Screenshot from a video shared by Al Masdar Online on 20 May 2026 showing burning tires outside the entrance of the Shamlan Water Factory in Sana'a. According to the source, the factory's entrance was blocked by Houthi-affiliated individuals, preventing distribution trucks from leaving the facility. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 13 July 2026.

Restaurants

In August 2026, a post by Taiz News Network quoted the owner of the "New Fish" seafood store in Sana'a saying that increasing levies and pressure from Houthi supervisors had forced him to borrow YR3.5 million (USD 6,600) to keep his business operating. He warned that if these practices continued, he would be forced to sell his business, stating that traders were increasingly threatened with either continuing to make payments or having their businesses closed.

A post published by Al Marsa News on Facebook in August 2025 reported that Galaxy Restaurant in Sana'a permanently closed due to ongoing financial demands imposed by the Houthis. According to the post, the restaurant owner stated that the decision followed a prolonged period of financial pressure from payments imposed by Houthi-affiliated authorities without receiving corresponding public services, making continued business operations unsustainable despite the restaurant's established customer base.

In the same month, a separate post by Al Marsa News, citing an interview with a restaurant owner in Al Hudaydah Governorate, described the reported impact of revenue collection practices on small businesses. According to the report, the owner closed his restaurant after several months of operation, stating that multiple financial demands imposed by the Houthis and increasing operating costs made it impossible to continue the business.

Markets and shops

Open-source reporting documented the use of business closures, detention, and other enforcement measures in connection with payment demands.

In September 2020, Al Arabiya reported that Houthi committees threatened shop owners in Sana'a who refused to make requested payments with restrictions and closure of their businesses.

According to a report by Al Ain News published on 24 February 2021, Houthi field committees carried out revenue collection campaigns targeting traders in Sana'a. The report stated that seven markets and 102 shops were temporarily closed, and more than 40 traders were reportedly detained after refusing to pay financial demands ranging from 100,000 to one million Yemeni rials (USD 189-1,890). According to the report, Houthi officials directed that businesses not be reopened and detained traders not be released until the required payments, together with additional penalties, had been paid.

According to a post by Sanaa Now on X on 17 August 2025, Houthis reportedly detained a number of shop owners in Sana'a after they refused to make financial contributions requested in connection with Mawlid celebrations (the annual commemoration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad). The post stated that authorities imposed payments of up to 30,000 Yemeni rials (USD 57) on small shops and 100,000 Yemeni rials (USD 189) on medium-sized businesses, and reportedly required shop owners to install decorative lights at their own expense, with threats of detention or financial penalties for non-compliance.

In July 2026, local sources in Al Bayda reported that Houthi authorities closed a privately owned commercial market in Rada'a after its owner, Sheikh Saleh Masaad Al Ahmadi Al Qayfi, reportedly refused to sign an agreement granting the Houthi authorities half of the market's financial revenues. According to the sources, the closure formed part of continued pressure on the detained owner to comply with the reported demands.

Additional open-source information described cases in which employees of commercial establishments were reportedly detained to pressure business owners into paying levies or alleged zakat arrears. In May 2025, local sources in Ibb reported that shop workers were detained by armed members of the Houthi-affiliated Zakat Authority and held in detention facilities operated by the authority until business owners paid the demanded levies (described as ‘Zakat arrears’). Similar practices were reported in the same month in Sana'a and Al Hudaydah, where workers from companies, shops, restaurants, and cafés were reportedly detained during collection campaigns linked to licensing fees, road improvement charges, and other financial demands including some related to rebuilding of infrastructure damaged by American and Israeli bombing. More recently, in August 2026, a trader in Sana'a stated that one of his employees remained detained after he had already paid YR1 million (USD 1,890) to the Houthi-controlled Zakat Office (the local office of the Zakat Authority), alleging that additional payments were demanded before the employee would be released.

Other businesses

In a video posted on X by Barran Press in February 2026, a honey seller and digital content creator stated that Houthi authorities required him to submit a zakat declaration for his Facebook page, describing it as part of broader revenue collection measures targeting small entrepreneurs and online content creators. In a separate case, a Facebook post published in May 2026 by Al Rased shared news that the General Authority of Zakat in Sana'a had required a law firm to appear before the authority within two days to submit what was described as an annual zakat declaration, while warning that failure to comply could result in fines and the closure of the firm.

According to a video circulated on social media in October 2025 documenting a meeting between the Houthi-controlled General Investment Authority and the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, business representatives stated that repeated levies, increased taxes, and inconsistent regulations had placed significant financial pressure on the private sector. Participants reportedly stated that dozens of factories, particularly in the water, food, and pharmaceutical sectors, had ceased operations, while some investors had reduced their activities or relocated their businesses outside Houthi-controlled areas due to the deteriorating business environment.

Trade, Transportation, and Supply Chains

As outlined above, Houthi authorities have established an internal customs network along trade routes during the conflict. According to the Mokha Center, goods entering Yemen through internationally recognized government-controlled ports are subject to additional customs assessments and fees when transported into Houthi-controlled areas. This has effectively created internal economic boundaries within Yemen, requiring traders transporting goods from Aden or Mokha to Sana'a to pass through multiple collection points (at the time this investigation was drafted, Mokha was outside Houthi control; Houthi forces captured the city on 10 September 2026).

According to Al Arabiya, on 8 June 2025, the Houthis established a checkpoint referred to as the "Damt Customs" south of Damt city on the Ad Dali - Sana'a road, which had reopened on 29 May 2025. The report stated that commercial trucks transporting goods imported through the Port of Aden were required to pay additional customs fees despite traders presenting documentation indicating that customs duties had already been paid at the port. The report further stated that the additional charges increased the transportation costs of commercial goods moving into Houthi-controlled areas. A video shared by Al Hadath Yemen on 15 July 2025 appeared to show the same checkpoint location, which the source described as a Houthi revenue collection point in Damt District, Ad Dali Governorate, established following the reopening of the road connecting Ad Dali and Sana'a. According to the accompanying text, the checkpoint was used to collect additional payments from commercial vehicles and goods travelling between Aden and Sana'a.

Screenshot from a video shared by Al Hadath Yemen showing what was reported to be a newly established Houthi revenue collection point along the Ad Dali - Sana'a road. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 15 July 2026.

Map from Google Maps showing the route between Sana’a and Aden, passing through Dhamar, Yarim, Damt, Ad Dali, and Lahij. The highlighted road was annotated by Yemeni Archive and captured on 17 September 2026.

A video by Belqees TV in April 2026 documented what the source described as the collection of unauthorized fees at several checkpoints in Lahij Governorate. The video did not identify which authority controlled the mentioned checkpoint. According to the source, truck drivers and commercial transport operators reported delays and additional financial burdens while transporting goods through these routes.

As an example of how checkpoints directly affect civilians’ daily lives, a video circulated online in March 2026 reportedly showed a patient retrieving his personal medication after it had been confiscated at a newly established Houthi checkpoint in Afar, Al Bayda Governorate. The patient was reportedly required to pay a compulsory fee to recover the medication for his chronic illness.

These examples show that transportation routes and commercial supply chains reportedly serve as additional points for revenue collection, affecting the movement and cost of goods.

Responses by Businesses and Community

Open source research found a range of responses by businesses, traders, and individuals to reported revenue collection practices in Houthi-controlled areas.

Strikes and Protests

According to Asharq Al-Awsat, in November 2025 commercial sector representatives alleged that Houthi authorities sought to increase customs duties and taxes on clothing, textiles, and related products by up to 250 percent. On 10 November, the General Union of Clothing, Textile and Footwear Traders issued a call for collective action in response to the measures. The Union then announced a three-day strike from 19 November 2025, in protest against decisions issued by the Houthi Ministry of Finance. Shops in Bab Al Salam Market, one of Sana’a’s largest wholesale markets for clothing, footwear, and haberdashery, reportedly closed as part of the strike.

Image of a document issued by the General Union of Clothing, Textile and Footwear Traders calling on traders and importers to strike and refrain from releasing containers from customs until the disputed decisions were withdrawn. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 14 August 2026.

Screenshot showing a statement by the General Union of Clothing and Textile Merchants calling for a three-day strike in protest against decisions issued by the Houthi Ministry of Finance. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 13 August 2026.

Screenshot from a video shared by Al Hadath Al Yemeni on 19 November 2025 reportedly showing closed shops during a strike by clothing and fabric merchants in Sana'a. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 16 July 2026.

In response, the Houthi-affiliated Economic Front disputed reports about the scale of the tax increases, stating that the increase amounted to only 2 percent on clothing imported through land crossings and that taxes on goods entering through seaports had not increased (their figures may have been referring to previous tax increases, not future plans). It justified the measures as intended to protect local production and described the strike as “illegal”. The Economic Front also stated that taxes on imported goods could be increased by 100 percent in the future and encouraged traders to import through seaports to benefit from lower fees.

A video report by Al Hadath Yemen in January 2026 stated that truck drivers transporting cement in Dhamar Governorate suspended operations, and merchants announced a strike, in protest against increased fees. According to Yemen Daily News, cement merchants said that Houthi authorities had increased fees on locally produced cement by 50 percent, from YR480 to YR690 (from USD 0.9 to 1.30) per bag, while Ahdath Al Alam reported that the fee increased to YR720 (USD 1.36) per bag. Traders stated that the measure would raise the cost of a bag of cement from approximately YR3,000 to YR3,700 (from USD 5.70 to 7) and warned that the additional costs could affect construction activity and increase financial burdens on consumers and investors (Yemeni Archive could not determine whether there were other fees raised in addition to the known fee per bag).

Screenshot showing a statement issued by cement agents and distributors in January 2026 opposing the increase in customs fees on locally produced cement. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 13 August 2026.

Screenshot from a video shared by Al Hadath Al Yemeni in January 2026 reportedly showing trucks stopped at a Houthi checkpoint in Dhamar Governorate. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 16 July 2026.

A video published on Facebook on 21 July 2025 reportedly showed hundreds of traders and importers demonstrating in Sana'a in protest against Houthi decisions affecting their businesses. The post stated that demonstrators opposed increases in customs duties and restrictions on imports, with participants carrying placards with slogans rejecting measures they said threatened their livelihoods.

Screenshot from a video shared by Al Hadath Al Yemeni reportedly showing a demonstration by traders and importers in Sana'a in July 2025. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 16 July 2026.

Burning Merchandise

According to a November 2025 post by Al Rased on Facebook, a man reportedly set fire to his vehicle loaded with qat at the Arafaf checkpoint in Damt District, Ad Dali Governorate, in protest against reported increases in fees imposed by the Houthis on qat suppliers (it is not clear whether this is the same checkpoint in Damt District described earlier). The post stated that the incident occurred amid growing opposition among suppliers to the reported increase in revenue collection.

A July 2026 post by Belqees TV on X reported that several street vendors in Sana'a burned their merchandise in protest against the Houthis’ imposition of ‘Khums’ zakat on their sources of income. The vendors stated that the measure increased their cost of living and directly affected their livelihoods.

Screenshot from Al-Yemen Al-Jumhuri showing Articles 47 and 48 of the Zakat Law regulations concerning the 20% ‘Khums’ levy and the distribution of its revenues. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 14 August 2026.

Screenshot from a video published by Belqees TV in July 2026 reportedly showing street vendors in Sana'a burning their goods. Captured by Yemeni Archive on 20 July 2026.

Legal Action

Other local companies reportedly filed legal cases against the Houthi-controlled Zakat Authority in 2023 after alleging that they had been compelled to make additional financial payments. A Facebook post stated that 16 companies were seeking judicial remedies despite concerns raised by commercial sources regarding the independence of the complaint process. Later reporting by Yemenat in April 2025 claimed that legal challenges against the Zakat Authority had continued, with the Public Funds Court in Sana’a reportedly considering 27 cases brought by companies and traders against the Authority. The cases followed unsuccessful appeals against zakat amounts imposed on businesses. It is unclear whether any of these cases were among the 16 reported in 2023.

Broader Economic and Social Consequences

According to a report by Asharq Al-Awsat, commercial sources stated that increased levies on traders and vendors have forced many businesses to reduce their workforce, while others have declared bankruptcy. However, broader trends in unemployment, poverty, and economic contraction documented by official and United Nations sources cannot be attributed to these practices alone and have occurred in the context of Yemen’s wider conflict and economic crisis.

Open-source information described cases in which traders considered relocating their commercial activities due to customs and other administrative measures. In May 2024 Mareb Press cited lawyer Abdulmailk Al-Aqida as stating that 43 traders in Sana’a were preparing to relocate their businesses to Aden or outside Yemen. According to Al-Aqida, the traders planned to relocate due to customs procedures, including the reported detention of commercial goods at checkpoints for several months, which they said resulted in financial losses and missed sales. Khlaasa Net reported the same account, also quoting lawyer Al-Aqida as stating that some traders were considering relocating to Aden, Marib, Hadramawt, or outside Yemen.

The described consequences of these additional costs imposed on businesses have long been linked to higher consumer prices. Since 2019, Yemen Etihadi reported that traders in Sana’a attributed increases in the prices of food and consumer goods in part to higher customs charges, repeated customs assessments, and other financial demands by the Houthis, stating that traders increased prices to compensate for these costs. Then in 2021, economist Adel Shamsan, speaking in a video interview with Al Hadath Yemen, similarly argued that additional tax and customs levies imposed on traders increased their costs and could lead them to raise prices, transferring part of the financial burden to consumers.

In a report by IranWire, researchers argued that the 2020 amendments to the Houthi Zakat Law could contribute to widening social and economic inequalities and societal divisions by granting exclusive financial privileges to specific groups.

The reported expansion of revenue collection practices has occurred amid prolonged economic hardship in Houthi-controlled areas. While public-sector salaries have remained suspended for many employees and basic services have reportedly continued to deteriorate, reporting has also noted the absence of published state budgets and detailed financial disclosures regarding the collection and allocation of public revenues. As a result, the scale of revenues and patterns of public expenditure remain difficult to independently verify.

Conclusion

Open-source material reviewed by Yemeni Archive documents Houthi revenue collection practices affecting businesses at multiple stages of economic activity, including production, licensing, importation, transportation, sale, and service provision. Collection practices and their stated justifications ranged from general taxation, customs duties and zakat, which existed prior to the conflict; to politically-motivated fundraising campaigns related to Palestine and the Houthi military, and broader application of zakat such as ‘Khums’. Reporting also documented enforcement practices including detention of employees, displays of force, threats of closure, and restrictions on commercial activity in connection with payment demands.

Sources attributed increased operating and transportation costs, disruptions to the movement of goods, temporary and permanent business closures, and protests and strikes by traders to some of these measures. While the broader economic consequences of these practices cannot be fully separated from the effects of Yemen's ongoing conflict and economic crisis, it is plausible that these measures have contributed to economic hardship and shortages in Houthi-controlled areas.

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Levies and Revenue Collection Practices in Houthi-Controlled Areas

Table Of Contents

INVESTIGATIONS